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The Emerging Role of the Court of Customs &
Patent Appeals in Import Regulation: Astra-
Sjuco, A.B. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission
In 1974 Congress amended section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to
allow for expanded appellate review of International Trade Commission
(ITC) decisions.' The United States Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (CCPA) is now empowered to review final determinations of the
I Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703, as amendedby Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 2053 (1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West & West
Supp. 1981)). The statute reads in part as follows:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent
of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an
industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, . . . are
declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt
with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in this section.
(b)(l) The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on
complaint under oath or upon its initiative. Upon commencing any such investi-
gation, the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal Register. The
Commission shall conclude any such investigation, and make its determination
under this section, at the earliest practicable time, but not later than one year
. . . after the date of publication of notice of such investigation.
(c) The Commission shall determine, with respect to each investigation con-
ducted by it under this section, whether or not there is a violation of this section.
Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on
the record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the pro-
visions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5. All legal and equitable defenses
may be presented in all cases. Any person adversely affected by a final determi-
nation of the Commission under subsection (d), (e) or () of this section may ap-
peal such determination to the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals for review in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5. Notwithstanding the
foregoing provision of this subsection, Commission determinations under subsec-
tions (d), (e) and () of this section with respect to its findings on the public health
and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production
of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States
consumers, the amount and nature of bond or the appropriate remedy shall be
reviewable in accordance with section 706 of Title 5.
(d) If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this sec-
tion, that there is violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles con-
cerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be
excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of
such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in
the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should
not be excluded from entry. ...
(g)(l) If the Commission determines that there is a violation of this section, or
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ITC on behalf of any person adversely affected by such determinations.2
So far, six patent infringement cases have been brought before the CCPA
under section 1337(c), of which Astra-Sjuco, A.B. v. US Int'l Trade
Comm'n 3 is the most recent. Astra-Sjuco is the fourth case to be decided on
its merits and the first to present the CCPA with the issue of injury to a
U.S. domestic industry. 4 The CCPA considered three issues: 1) whether
the patent in question was valid; 2) whether the patent was infringed by
respondent's product; and 3) whether there was resulting injury to the
domestic industry. The court answered all three questions in the affirma-
tive and concurred with the ITC's determination to exclude respondent's
product from the United States for the duration of the patent.5
Subsection (a) of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 states that
[ujnfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States. . . , the effect or tendency of which is to
destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically
operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such
an industry,. . . are declared unlawful and when found by the Commis-
sion to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of
law, as provided in this section.
Complainant Steridyne Corporation is a domestic manufacturer of ther-
mometer sheath packages, and the exclusive licensee under two patents
held by George Poncy.6 Steridyne filed a complaint with the ITC alleg-
that, for purposes of subsection (e) of this section, there is reason to believe that
there is such a violation, it shall-(A) publish such determination in the Federal Register, and
(B) transmit to the President a copy of such determination and the action
taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f) of this section, with respect thereto, together
with the record upon which such determination is based.
(2) If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the day
on which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy rea-
sons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disap-
proval, then, effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the
action taken under subsection (d), (e), or () of this section with respect thereto
shall have no force or effect.
2 Id. § 1337(d).
3 629 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
4 The five previous cases to reach the CCPA are: Stevenson v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
612 F.2d 546 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628
(C.C.P.A. 1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247 (C.C.P.A.
1978); Rohm & Haas Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 554 F.2d 462 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Import
Motors Ltd., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (stay of ITC
hearing pending appeal); 530 F.2d 938 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (appeal dismissed).
5 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976) provides for a so-called permanent exclusion order (PEO).
Two other possible remedies are the temporary exclusion order (TEO), provided under
§ 1337(e), and the cease and desist order, provided under § 1337(f). The TEO is used where
continued importation pending a hearing and final order would substantially damage com-
plainant's industry. Under a TEO, the foreign goods are either excluded from entry, or allowed
in only under bond. The cease and desist order was added as a result of pressure for a less
drastic remedy than total exclusion. Unlike the PEO or TEO, the cease and desist order is an in
personam remedy, directed at the importers and distributors themselves. The ITC has been
reluctant to employ the cease and desist order because it is so easily avoided by merely switching
importers.
6 629 F.2d at 683.
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ing that Astra-Sjuco, a Swedish supplier of thermometer sheath pack-
ages, was exporting sheath packages into the United States which
infringed the Poncy patents. 7 Also named as defendants were the domes-
tic importer and the distributor of the Swedish sheath package. The ITC
is authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) and (d) to investigate any alleged
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, and, if
appropriate, to exclude such articles from further entry. The ITC came
to the conclusion that the foreign thermometer sheaths were infringing
the U.S. patents and causing injury to the domestic industry, here solely
Steridyne, and ordered an exclusion of the respondent's sheath packages
from the United States for the life of the Poncy patents.8
Pursuant to section 1337(c), Astra-Sjuco and the domestic importers
appealed the determination to the CCPA. They based their appeal on
three claims: 1) that the Poncy patents were invalid;9 2) that they were
not infringed;' 0 and 3) that there was no injury to the domestic industry
as a result of the importation of the Swedish sheath packages." The
court undertook a detailed examination of the respective claims of the
Poncy and Astra-Sjuco patents and found that Astra-Sjuco had infringed
several of the Poncy claims.' 2 The court then considered the issue of
patent validity and found, using standard patent validity tests,' 3 that the
Poncy patents were valid. Finally, the court considered the injury ques-
tion and, based on the evidence in the record of the Commission's deter-
mination, it found the quantum of injury required by the statute for
exclusion. 14
The focus of this note will be on the injury question. To fully under-
stand the nature of the Commission proceeding and the significance of
the court's holding, however, a familiarity with the historical back-
ground of section 1337 and with the evolving role the CCPA has taken in
its enforcement is necessary.
71d.
8 Certain Thermometer Sheath Packages; Commission Determination and Order, 44
Fed. Reg. 45,270 (1979).
9 629 F.2d at 688.
10 Id. at 686.
11 Id. at 690.
12 Id. at 688, 689. Although this discussion will not focus on the infringement issue, a brief
outline of the steps used by the court in determining infringement may be helpful. The court
first determined the meaning of the claims in issue by analysis of all relevant patent documents.
Then the claims were "read on" or compared with, the accused product. The court found that
Astra-Sjuco's thermometer sheath contained the same features as found in the claims of the
Poncy patents.
13 Methods for determining patent validity fall beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly,
the most commonly used test and the one concerning the Astra-Sjuco court was that of obvi-
ousness----whether the invention would have been obvious at the time it was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. To determine obviousness, a court will look at prior art, com-
mercial success, and unresolved needs and failures of others solved by the patent in question.
629 F.2d at -688-89. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I (1966) for a thorough
discussion of patentability and obviousness.
14 629 F.2d at 690.
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The present version of section 1337 has its roots in section 316 of the
Tariff Act of 1922.' 5 The 1922 report of the Senate Finance Committee
stated that section 316 was designed to be "a more adequate protection
to American industry than any antidumping statute the country has ever
had."' 6 Section 316 set out the present criteria for determining remedi-
able unfair acts, namely, those whose "effect or tendency" is to "destroy
or substantially injure" an "efficiently and economically operated" do-
mestic industry.' 7 The Tariff Commission, predecessor to the ITC, was
empowered to investigate alleged violations and issue findings and rec-
ommendations to the President. The findings were to be conclusive, ex-
cept for an elaborate provision for appeal on "questions of law" to the
U.S. Court of Customs Appeals' 8 and to the U.S. Supreme Court.' 9 In
1930, the Supreme Court held, in the landmark case of Frscher &Co., Inc.
v. Bakelie Corp. ,20 that violation of patent rights was an "unfair method
of competition" covered by section 316.21 Later that year, Congress sub-
stantially reenacted section 316 as section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930,
removing only the explicit right of appeal to the Supreme Court, and the
power of the President to impose an additional tariff on the imported
product to offset the advantage gained by the unfair method.22
In the years before the 1974 amendment, judicial review of Tariff
Commission decisions was infrequent 23 and when invoked, so circum-
scribed by the statute as to be essentially nugatory. According to the
1930 statute, the findings of the Commission could be appealed to the
CCPA on "questions of law" only.24 If the court found that additional
evidence should have been taken by the Commission, and there were
"reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence" in the original
proceedings, it could remand the case to the Commission for further tak-
ing of evidence. The Commission could then modify or reverse its earlier
findings, which again would be subject to appeal as above. This last
decision of the court would be final. 25
The major flaw in this procedure was that the Commission's final
report to the President, which included the CCPA's decision, was merely
15 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 943 (repealed 1930).
16 S. REP. No. 595, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922) at 3.
17 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 3 16(a), 42 Stat. 943 (repealed 1930).
18 The name of the court was changed in 1929 to its present form, the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. See Act of Mar. 2, 1929, Pub. L. No. 914, ch. 488, § 1, 45 Stat.
1475,
19 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 3 16(c), 42 Stat. 943 (repealed 1930).
20 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930).
21 Id. at 260.
22 Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 1.
23 Only six such cases came before the court between 1922 and 1962. See Glidden v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). These cases are referred to, although not specifically named, in the
Brief on Behalf of the Chief Judge and Associate Judges of the United States Court of Customs
& Patent Appeals, Amid Curiae in Glidden, at 10.
24 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337(c), 46 Stat. 703 (current version at 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 13 37(c) (West Supp. 1981)).
25 Id.
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advisory. The President had full power to concur with or to disregard
the report in his decision to select a remedy or to take no action whatso-
ever. 26 Therefore, judicial power was reduced to a review of mere advice
which the President had the power to totally disregard. 27 The Supreme
Court referred to these CCPA decisions as "extrajudicial revisory opin-
ions."'28 In other words, the CCPA's review was limited to revising the
Commission's recommendations, and therefore was itself advisory in na-
ture. This characterization raised a constitutional dilemma regarding
the status and jurisdiction of the CCPA. The Supreme Court in 1929
had held unequivocally that "the Court of Customs Appeals is a legisla-
tive and not a constitutional court,' 29 and therefore able to issue advi-
sory opinions. 30 In 1958 however, Congress declared the CCPA to be an
Article III court, 3 1 with jurisdiction limited to "cases and controversies,"
and thereby effectively removed the court's jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the Tariff Commission under section 337.32 The Supreme Court
spoke on this issue again in the 1962 case of Glidden v. Zdanok, 33 reversing
its earlier holding in Bakelite by declaring the CCPA to be a constitu-
tional court. 34 The Court explained that Congress had originally in-
tended the CCPA to be a constitutional court and that its declaration in
1958 merely clarified that original intent. 35 Justice Harlan's opinion at-
tempted to resolve the jurisdictional quandary by finding that "[i]t does
not follow . . . from the invalidity, actual or potential, of these heads of
jurisdiction [over section 337 decisions] . . . that the CCPA must relin-
quish entitlement to recognition as an Article III court." 36  Justice
Harlan noted the miniscule number of section 337 appeals heard by the
court since the passage of the 1922 Act and added, "[c]ertainly the status
of a. . . Court of Appeals would not be altered by a mere congressional
attempt to invest it with such insignificant nonjudicial business. . . . We
think that, if necessary, the particular offensive jurisdiction, and not the
26 Id. § 337(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976)).
27 See Metzger & Musrey,udtiialRevew of Tariff Commission Actions and Proceedings, 56 COR-
NELL L. REv. 285, 307-08 (1971).
28 370 U.S. at 582.
29 Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929).
30 This is in contrast to a court created under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, whose
jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1976).
32 Revisory opinions on Commission recommendations are not decisions rendered in de-
termination of cases or controversies. "Cases and controversies" have been defined as those
questions presented in an adversarial form and capable of resolution through the judicial pro-
cess. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). It has been held traditionally that no justiciable
controversy is presented to an Article III court when the parties seek only an advisory opinion.
Id. See also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). C. WRIGHT, ON FEDERAL COURTS
34 (ist ed. 1963), states that "the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of jus-
ticiability is that federal courts will not give advisory opinions." See also United States v. Frue-
hauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961), and cases cited therein.
33 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
34 1d. at 583.
35 Id. at 541-42.
36 Id. at 582.
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[court], would fall."'3 7
It is apparent from the language of the opinion that the Court did
not completely foreclose section 337 jurisdiction. Because no appeals
were brought to the CCPA between 1962 and 1974, however, the
Supreme Court was denied the opportunity to remove conclusively the
CCPA's section 337 revisory authority. The 1974 amendment to section
337 rendered the issue moot without the Supreme Court or the CCPA
offering further commentary.
38
The principal cause of the CCPA's jurisdictional controversy was its
inability to review the validity of the subject patent in infringement cases
under section 337. In Frischer, the CCPA had held unequivocally that "it
[is] neither the right nor the duty of the Tariff Commission to pass upon
the question" of patent validity. 39 The procedure thereafter established
was for the Tariff Commission 'and the CCPA to presume the validity of
the patent unless it had been previously adjudicated in a federal district
court and found invalid. The situation therefore evolved into one where
the patent owner would simply show the existence of his patent and an
importation that infringed its claims, and would be able to get the im-
ported item excluded. There was no need to show either validity, which
was presumed, or injury to the patent holder's business.40 The magni-
tude of the problem was vividly expressed by Judge Garrett's dissenting
opinion in Frtscher. He observed that "additional duties may be levied,
or an embargo declared, based upon a claim of patent which . . . may
be found to be null and void, and to have been so from the very
beginning." 4 1
Moreover, the CCPA was compelled to make its determination
based solely on the often meager record of the proceedings supplied by
37 Id. at 583. [Emphasis in original.)
38 See Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 1, at § 337(b), (c) & (g)(2) (current version at 19
U.S.C.A. § 1337(b), (c) & (g)(2) (1976)); see also accompanying text at notes 46-50.
39 39 F.2d at 258. Judge Graham stated that the Tariff Commission was merely a fact-
finding body possessing no judicial powers. He noted that Congress, in the Tariff Act of 1922,
the Act which created the Tariff Commission, gave not the "slightest intimation" that its pur-
pose was to give the Commission jurisdiction to consider the validity of a patent. Moreover,
Judge Graham expressed doubt as to whether Congress even had the authority to confer "case
and controversy" jurisdiction on an administrative body. d. at 258. See also In re Von Clemm,
229 F.2d 441, 444 (C.C.P.A. 1955). The Von Clemm case resulted from an appeal by the respon-
dent from the Commission's finding of a violation in Synthetic Star Sapphires and Star Rubies,
T.C. Inv. No. 337-13 (1954). The CCPA held that, because no district court holding of patent
invalidity was alleged, it was forced to regard the patent as valid under Frscher and its progeny.
Regarding the infringement issue, the court noted that complainant's evidence consisted of tes-
timony by one of its inventors who stated that, although he did not know how respondent's
stones were produced, he believed they must be produced by the same process as that of com-
plainant. This testimony, combined with respondent's failure to explain how his stones were
made, was held substantial evidence of infringement. Finally, although the record revealed no
actual injury to complainant, the court found that the evidence supported a "tendency" to
injure. On these bases, the court ordered exclusion of the imported gemstones. 229 F.2d at 444-
45.
40 229 F.2d at 445-56 (Cole, dissenting). See also 39 F.2d at 267 (Garrett dissenting).
41 39 F.2d at 267 (Garrett, dissenting).
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the Tariff Commission. Because much of the crucial information re-
vealed to the Commission was confidential business information, it
would not be included in the record. The court was therefore forced to
base its review upon a skeletal version of the Commission's evidence,
eliminating the possibility for effective review.
In sum, before 1974, the CCPA's holdings were mere commentaries
on Commission recommendations, with no legal force and based upon
almost no recorded evidence. After the 1958 declaration of its status as
an Article III court, the CCPA did not even have the jurisdiction to
render these advisory opinions. 42 Furthermore, neither the Commission
nor the CCPA was authorized to adjudicate the validity of the subject
patent. 43
The magnitude of the patent validity problem was revealed in the
Commission's 1968 Furazoh'done decision. 44 Contrary to previous prac-
tice, the Commission refused to wait for the results of patent validity
cases pending in the District Court before making its final affirmative
determination of patent infringement.4 5 The importer did not appeal
the determination. If the importer had chosen to appeal, however, the
CCPA would have been faced with the dilemma created when the
Supreme Court in Zdanok affirmed it as an Article III court. In other
words, because the Commission's decision was reached without a deter-
mination of the validity of the subject patent, there would have been no
case or controversy for the court to review on appeal. As a result, the
court would have been required to either refuse review under Article III
of the Constitution and thereby deprive the importer of his section 337
right to appeal, or accept review and make some clarifying statement as
to the scope of its jurisdiction. Because the importer did not appeal, an
ultimate solution was forced to await the 1974 amendment of section
337.46
The 1974 amended version of section 337, renumbered section 1337,
is essentially identical to the present form of the statute. The amend-
ment was a drastic revision that attempted to resolve 50 years of confu-
sion that had developed around section 337. First, the amendment
transformed Commission "recommendations" into "final determina-
tions" subject to judicial review, which are binding on the parties in the
42 See 370 U.S. at 582.
43 See, Metzger & Musrey, supra note 27, at 319. In order to circumvent this obstacle to
review, the Commission's practice, in cases where patent validity was a crucial issue, was to
defer to district court decisions regarding validity.
44 Furazolidone, Inv. No. 337-21, T.C. Pub. No. 229 (November 1969). In 1968, petitioner
Norwich Pharmacy Co. filed a complaint against certain importers of furazolidone, alleging
unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation and sale of the drug. Peti-
tioner alleged infringement of certain claims of its U.S. patent. The Commission found in-
fringement and recommended exclusion for the duration of petitioner's patent. See
Furazolidone, Findings of Unfair Methods and Acts, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,410 (1969).
45 Metzger & Musrey, supra note 27, at 319-20.
46 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2053, § 341(a) (1975), amending Tariff
Act of 1930 ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930).
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absence of a presidential veto. The President can overrule a Commission
determination only for "policy reasons," presumably possible conflicts
with foreign policy positions. 4 7 The CCPA's jurisdictional problem was
thereby obviated. Most important for purposes of this analysis, however,
was the addition of the following sentence to section 1337(c): "[a]ll legal
and equitable defenses may be presented in all cases." The Commission
and therefore the CCPA were thus authorized to consider and decide the
issue of patent validity when raised as a defense by the respondent. In
addition, the CCPA was expressly vested with jurisdiction to review de-
terminations of the Tariff Commission, renamed the International Trade
Commission. 48 Appeals may be brought by "any person adversely af-
fected by a final determination of the Commission under subsection (d),
(e), or (f)" of section 1337. 4 9
The 1974 amendment of section 337 altered both the characteristics
of the Commission's investigations and the scope of CCPA review.
Under amended section 1337(a), the Commission in a patent infringe-
ment case looks at four factors: 1) is there an unfair act in the importa-
tion or sale of the article (infringement of a valid U.S. patent); 2) is the
effect or tendency of the unfair act to destroy or substantially injure a
domestic industry; 3) is the domestic industry efficiently and economi-
cally operated; and 4) if there is an injurious unfair act, is it in the public
interest to exclude the article from the United States?
In practice, the Commission will first examine the infringement
question. If it finds infringement, it will then examine the validity of the
patent, applying the standard criteria of such a determination. 50 After
the Commission finds that infringement of a valid U.S. patent has oc-
47 President Carter vetoed the Commission's affirmative determination in the case of Cer-
tain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Inv. No. 337-TA-29, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 963 (Feb.
1978), an antitrust investigation. See Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, Press Release No. 269 (April 25, 1978). The Senate report on the 1974 amendment stated
that,
It is recognized ... that the granting of relief against imports could have a very
direct and substantial impact on United States foreign relations, economic and
political. Further, the President would often be able to best see the impact which
the relief ordered by the Commission may have upon the public health and wel-
fare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like
or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consum-
ers. Senate Committee on Finance, Trade Reform Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1,199, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186,
7331.
For a more complete discussion of the present scope of the ITC's authority in the non-patent
area, see Minchew & Webster, Regulatig Unfair Practices in International Trade. The Role of the
United States International Trade Commission, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (1978).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1976).
49 The definition of "final determination" has proven to be elusive. The Senate Finance
Committee's Report on H.R. 10710 attempted to clarify the phrase as "a Commission determi-
nation which has been referred to the President under amended subsection (g) of§ 337, and has
been approved by the President within the 60 day period after referral of the determination."
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 47, at 197, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7329-30. See also discussion note 5 supra.
50 See discussion note 13 supra.
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curred, it will consider the third aspect of its investigation, that is,
whether an injury has occurred.
The determination of injury is often the most complex facet of the
investigation. The Commission first must find the existence of a domes-
tic industry5 ' which must be efficiently and economically operated. The
industry must have suffered, or be about to suffer, an injury. The Com-
mission then carefully examines the alleged unfair importation and the
asserted injury to find the necessary causal link. Each of these issues is
crucial-petitioner's claim may be rejected upon the Commission's nega-
tive determination of any one of them. Finally, even if the petitioner
successfully proves an unfair act resulting in injury to his efficiently and
economically operated domestic industry, he may be denied relief if the
Commission determines it is not in the public interest to exclude the of-
fending article from the United States.
The Commission begins its injury investigation by ascertaining the
presence of a domestic industry. A domestic industry is defined as "the
domestic operations of the patent owner, his assignees and licensees de-
voted to such exploitation of the patent. '52 A domestic industry may
even be confined to the single facility of the complainant. 53 The efficient
and economic operation of the industry is determined through such char-
acteristics as well-equipped and modern facilities, an increase in produc-
tion as compared to the rest of the domestic industry, any improvement
of the product by complainant, a favorable asset/liability ratio, good
credit standing, reputation among peers, and level of sales. 54 Examples
of criteria the Commission has used to determine injury include the
following: reduction in sales, idling of production facilities, decrease in
employment, increased market penetration by imported goods, decline in
profitability, damaging effect on the selling price of the domestic prod-
uct, loss of royalties or potential royalties by the domestic patentee
through licensee defection or reluctance to become a licensee, and capac-
ity and/or intention of the foreign manufacturer or importer to penetrate
the domestic market.5 5 There generally must be more than one indica-
51 The industry need not yet be in operation to qualify. A valid type of injury is the
prevention of the establishment of an industry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976). The Commis-
sion has stated that section 1337 protects "parties which are about to commence production and
for which section 337 violations would have the effect or tendency to frustrate efforts to found a
business." Certain Ultra-Microtome Freezing Attachments, Inv. No. 337-TA-10 (1976),
Comm'n Determ. at 10.
52 REPORT OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE ON H.R. 10710, H.R. REP.
No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1973).
53 See, e.g., Convertible Game Tables, T.C. Pub. No. 705 (March 1974); Lightweight Lug-
gage, T.C. Pub. No. 391 (April 1971).
54 Kaye & Plaia, Developments in Unfair Trade Practlies in International Trade. A Review of the
Third and Fourth Years under Section 337 as Amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
115, 139 (1979); Fisher, Protection Against Unfair Foreign Competition. Section 337 of the TariffAct of
1930, 13 VA.J. INT'L L. 158, 171 (1972); Lightweight Luggage, supra note 53, at 3; Ampicillion,
T.C. Pub. No. 345 (Nov. 1970) at 39-40; In-the-Ear Hearing Aids, T.C. Pub. No. 182 (July
1966) at 20.
55 Kaye & Plaia, supra note 54, at 135; Fisher, supra note 54, at 173. See, e.g., the ITC's
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tion of injury present to establish a causal link between the indications
and the importation. Any one of these "symptoms" might have a variety
of domestic sources and alone provide too weak a link to justify a remedy
as drastic as exclusion. In short, the more indications of injury a peti-
tioner can show-all other requirements being present-the more likely
the Commission is to find causation and order exclusion. 56
Finally, if a violation is found under the above standards, the Com-
mission applies the public interest test promulgated under section
1337(d). Before the ITC can order permanent exclusion of an article, it
must balance protection of the U.S. patent with possible detriment to the
consumer and to the economy in general. It will consider whether the
item is an essential of life,57 and whether the domestic industry is now
and will continue to be capable of providing adequate quantities of de-
pendable products of reasonable quality at fair prices.58
The CCPA can consider all of these issues on appeal. The court
cannot review the correctness of the remedies themselves, however; the
CCPA reviews only the violation determination. 59 Prior to the 1974
amendment, the court based the scope of its review on the so-called "sub-
stantial evidence" test. 60 In other words, if there was substantial evi-
dence in the Commission's record to support the findings, the court
would not overturn them.61 The CCPA then altered its approach to-
ward reviews of Customs Court decisions, adopting a "clearly contrary to
the weight of the evidence" standard. Because section 1337(c) 62 pro-
vided that the court review ITC determinations on the same basis as it
would consider an appeal from a U.S. Customs Court decision,63 ITC
decisions apparently were to be subject to the same "clearly contrary"
standard; that is, if the Commission's decision was not clearly contrary to
the weight of the evidence in the record, the court would let it stand.64
The difference between the two tests is one of degree. In a case where all
application of these criteria in Reclosable Plastic Bags, I.T.C. Pub. No. 801 (Jan. 1977); Con-
vertible Game Tables, note 53 supra; Panty Hose, T.C. Pub. No. 471 (March 1972).
56 See, e.g., Reclosable Plastic Bags, supra note 55, at 14 (injury shown under five criteria);
Convertible Game Tables, supra note 53, at 17 (injury shown under seven criteria); In-the-Ear
Hearing Aids, supra note 54, at 22-25 (multiple criteria present).
57 Certain Molded Golf Balls, I.T.C. Pub. No. 897 (July 1978); Photocubes, I.T.C. Pub.
No. 862 (Jan. 1978).
58 Reclosable Plastic Bags, supra note 55, at 16.
59 Kaye & Plaia, supra note 54, at 60.
60 Now codified as part of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1976).
61 See, e.g., 39 F.2d at 257.
62 In Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1283 (C.C.P.A. 1974), the
CCPA refused to apply the substantial evidence standard stating, "we are [not] bound to accept
the Custom Court's findings of fact whenever there is substantial supporting evidence, and we
will not do so when they are clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence." Id. at 1285. The
court found substantial evidence to support the Custom Court's findings, but "even more sub-
stantial evidence to support appellant's contentions." Id.
63 In 1922 and 1930, however, the standard of review of a Customs Court decision was in
fact that of substantial evidence, as in Frischer.
64 See text accompanying note 62 supra; see also Pollard Bearings Corp. v. United States,
511 F.2d 568, 571 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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that is required to uphold the Commission's determination is substantial
evidence, the court need only look to the prevailing party's evidence to
see if it established a prima facie case. Essentially, the court would over-
turn the Commission's determination only if no reasonable person could
have found as the Commission did. The 1974 standard implied a bal-
ancing of the parties' evidence to determine if the Commission based its
decision on the stronger of the two. This allowed the CCPA somewhat
more leeway to evaluate the evidence and exercise its own judgment, and
created a greater possibility that ITC determinations might be
overturned.
The Customs Courts Act of 198065 effected a change in the CCPA's
standard of review. Section 403(d) of the Act amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 2601(c) to provide that an appeal from the Customs Court to the
CCPA is to be sustained only if the lower court's findings are "clearly
erroneous." 66 Furthermore, section 604 of the Act amended 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(c) to return the standard of review in ITC appeals to the pre-1974
substantial evidence test found in section 706 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.6 7 In addition, the Act states that the ITC's non-adjudicative
public interest findings are subject to the same substantial evidence
standard. 68
Six patent infringement cases have been appealed to the CCPA
since 1975. The first case failed to reach the merits on the grounds that
the Commission had not made a "final determination."'6 9 The second
was dismissed on the grounds that even though a final determination had
been reached, it had not been adverse to appellee and no injury had
resulted. 70 The third case, and the first to be decided on the merits, was
Coleco Industries, Inc. v. US International Trade Commission.
7 1
Coleco Industries was the result of petitioner's appeal of the Certain
Above-Ground Swimming Pools investigation. 72 The Commission had com-
menced its investigation with the infringement issue. It had found no
infringement of any claims of the U.S. patent by the importation of the
swimming pools and therefore no section 1337 violation. The Commis-
sion therefore did not reach any further issues, including that of patent
validity. 73 The court undertook a detailed examination of the complain-
ant's patent and the construction of the imported items to make its own
65 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727.
66 28 U.S.C.A. § 2601(c) (West Supp. 1981).
67 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c) (West Supp. 1981). See Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383
U.S. 607, 619-20 (1976).
68 Id.
69 Import Motors Ltd., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 937 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
For a discussion of the "final determination" issue, see note 49 supra.
70 Rohm & Haats Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 554 F.2d 462 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
7 573 F.2d 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
72 I.T.C. Inv. No. 337-TA-25 (1977).
73 The court suggested that the Commission in the future decide on all appealable issues
presented to it to remove the need for remand if the court were to reverse the validity finding.
573 F.2d at 1252 n. 5.
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determination of whether there was infringement. Because the Commis-
sion had gone no further, however, the court was constrained to this lim-
ited review, and affirmed the Commission's determination.
Solder Removal Co. v. US International Trade Commission 74 reached the
court four months later. Petitioner had appealed from the Commission's
negative determination in the Certain Solder Removal Wicks investigation. 75
The Commission had considered only the validity issue, and made its
determination of no violation solely on the basis of the invalidity of the
subject patent.7 6 The court first articulated its "contrary to the weight of
the evidence" standard of review pursuant to section 1337(c). The court
noted that "[t]he 'substantial evidence' standard is particularly inappli-
cable to judicial review of patent validity under section 337."77 The
court then considered the claims of the subject patent and the expert
testimony in the Commission record and found that the Commission's
findings were not against the weight of the evidence, that these findings
revealed no section 1337 violation, and affirmed the ITC determination.
The third section 1337 case in which the court reached the merits
was Stevenson v. ITC,78 decided in late 1979. Petitioner had appealed the
Commission's termination of the investigation into Certain Skateboards and
Platforms Therefor, 79 because of a no-violation determination. Stevenson
was another Commission determination based solely on patent validity,
thereby again limiting CCPA review to only one of the many potential
aspects of a section 1337 patent infringement case. The court examined
the evidence on record to determine if the weight of the evidence sup-
ported the ITC's finding of patent invalidity.80 The court found no evi-
dence to support the holding, but found substantial evidence to the
contrary. The court therefore found the Commission determination to
be clearly against the weight of the evidence, and so reversed the finding
of no violation. The case was remanded to the Commission for further
investigation into the issues of infringement and injury.
Astra-Sjuco is the most recent and far-reaching CCPA section 1337
patent decision. The Commission had found infringement of the U.S.
patent and therefore had continued its investigation into the issues of
validity and injury. It found both validity of the patent and a sufficient
causal link between the alleged injury and the importation to order ex-
74 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
75 I.T.C. Inv. No. 337-TA-26 (1977).
76 The issue was again that of obviousness. The court also repeated its admonition to the
Commission to consider all appealable issues. 582 F.2d at 632 n. 6.
77 Id. at 632. The court noted that since there is some prior art to be found in the case of
virtually every patent which could constitute "substantial evidence" under the old standard,
"effective judicial review of Commission invalidity holdings would be nullified. ... Id.
78 612 F.2d 546 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
79 Inv. No. 337-TA-37 (1978).
80 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) states that a patent shall be presumed valid. A long line ofcases,
beginning in 1840 with Philadelphia & T. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. 448 (1840) and up to the
present, have held that this presumption may only be overcome by "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," or some other equally heavy burden.
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clusion of the import for the life of the patent."' The appeal thus
presented the court with its first opportunity to consider all the aspects of
a section 1337 patent infringement case.
In its decision, the CCPA combined a thorough review of the Com-
mission's and presiding officer's findings with its own examination of the
evidence to determine if the findings on infringement and validity were
clearly supported by the weight of the evidence. The court's discussion
of the injury issue, however, seems to be somewhat less thorough. The
court reviewed and accepted as valid indicia of injury and tendency to-
ward injury Steridyne's alleged declining profitability, its lost sales and
customers, the foreign manufacturer's large production and sales capac-
ity, and Steridyne's provable loss of future sales. All of these criteria are
apparently authorized by the ITC regulations, 8 2 and were given proper
weight by the court. The court was also satisfied, however, by what it
felt was persuasive causation evidence. The evidence was substantially
that the foreign importer used somewhat similar packaging, solicited
Steridyne's customers-at least one of whom switched products-and
captured forty percent of Steridyne's market in its first year. Addition-
ally, Steridyne experienced its decline in profits at the same time the
foreign product was establishing itself in the market. Finally, the court
made only the briefest reference to the appellant's claims and evidence.
The court then affirmed because "the Commission's affirmative determi-
nation of injury to an industry is supported by substantial evidence in
the record."'8 3
Certain difficulties with the Astra-Sjuco court's injury review are ap-
parent. First, the court neglected completely to consider the efficiency or
economical operation of the U.S. industry and the public interest criteria
as required by sections 1337(a) and (d).84 It failed to consider the crucial
"why" of appellant's notable commercial success in such a brief time.
The extreme nature of the effects on petitioner's industry in itself should
81 629 F.2d at 690.
82 19 C.F.R. § 210.1-.61 (1980).
83 629 F.2d at 690. Appellants' no-injury argument before the Commission rested on two
grounds: 1) Steridyne was able only to show specific lost sales in the amount of $815; and 2)
Steridyne's lost profits could be attributed mainly to consumer difficulty in using the product,
the increasing popularity of electronic thermometers, and the result of recent litigation against
Johnson & Johnson, which required Steridyne to limit its production. Thermometer Sheath
Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-56, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 992 (July 1979), Recommended Determina-
tion at 54, Commission Determination at 26. The Presiding Officer found, however, that a
preponderance of the evidence supported petitioner's theory of its lost profits rather than appel-
lants'. Recommended Determ. at 54-55. Indicia of injury found by the Presiding Officer in-
clude, in addition to lost sales, appellants' large production capacity and massive sales force as
compared to that of Steridyne. Id. at 55-56. The Commission affirmed the Presiding Officer's
findings based on a preponderance of the evidence in the record. Comm'n Determ. at 27. It
also found no public interest factors which would preclude issuing an exclusion order. Id. at 29.
84 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1976) requires the Commission to consider the effect of any exclu-
sion order on "the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States econ-
omy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers . .. ."
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have raised some eyebrows.8 5 Finally, the court's resurrection of the sub-
stantial evidence test, a standard of review abandoned by the court in
1975, was surprising. This decision was reached before Congress ap-
proved the substantial evidence standard in the Customs Courts Act of
1980.86
After the extensive review given the infringement and validity is-
sues, the court gave the injury issue rather short shrift and then applied a
less rigorous and at the time apparently discarded standard of review.
This approach seems to indicate that of the three facets of the determina-
tion, the court felt that its duty of review with regard to injury was the
least stringent. It appeared willing to summarily concur with the Com-
mission in the absence of a glaring inconsistency in the record.8 7 Perhaps
because the finding of injury was essentially unanimous at the ITC
level,88 the court saw no need for detailed reconsideration of the issue.
Yet the fact of unanimity below has never been grounds for limiting ap-
pellate review. Certainly, Steridyne's brief presented a bleak picture of
the company's fortunes since the imported product appeared on the
scene. Steridyne's counsel would be remiss if it did not present so con-
vincing a case. Yet for the court merely to accept this evidence as alleged
without the statutorily-required consideration of respondent's evidence
and the other issues, seems an abdication of its responsibility to protect
the public as well as the patent-holder. The dramatic shift of customers
from one product to the other in such a short period of time should indi-
cate something to the court other than injury to the patent-holder. Were
the domestic thermometer sheaths overpriced? Were they in adequate
supply, and of good quality? A much more stringent and inclusive stan-
dard of review is called for in this and all future appeals if the spirit of
the public interest test of section 1337(d), (e) and (f) is to be fulfilled.
Astra-Sj'co is the first case to present the CCPA with an injury issue.
85 Aside from capturing 40% of Steridyne's market in the first year, one of Steridyne's
major customers bought over one million of the foreign product and one of its sales representa-
tives also switched products. 629 F.2d at 690.
86 Customs Courts Act of 1980, supra note 65, at § 604 (codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c)
(West Supp. 1981)). The court's apparent confusion over which standard to apply may have
been a motivating factor in Congress's enactment of sections 403 and 604 of the Act. Essen-
tially, Congress retained the standard promulgated under the 1974 Act, to wit, review of ITC
determinations in the same manner as in the case of appeals from Customs Court decisions.
"Substantial evidence" under the Administrative Procedures Act has been authoritatively de-
fined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
Therefore, a holding based on anything less than substantial evidence---something less than
adequate to support a reasonable conclusion-would be clearly erroneous. Thus the 1980
amendment of section 1337(c) merely remedied the ambiguous language of the 1974 version
while effecting little substantive change.
87 Because the existence of injury in the instant case was fairly conclusive, the court's
failure to thoroughly consider the injury question did not result in an unjust decision.
8 The Presiding Officer and four of the Commissioners found injury. The remaining
Commissioner dissented on the ground of no infringement and did not proceed to consider the
injury issue. See Certain Thermometer Sheath Packages, Commission Determination, supra note
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It is amply evidenced by Astra-Sjiuco and other recent cases that the
CCPA has come far since the 1930's in the review of Commission deci-
sions. Its role is expected to continue to grow as the number of petitions
brought before the Commission dramatically increases each year.89 The
internationalization of business and the increased authority of the ITC
under the 1974 Act should transform the CCPA's role in section 1337
review from an insignificant to an important part of its jurisdiction.
Along with its greater exposure to section 1337 cases should come a
greater sophistication and sensitivity of approach. The CCPA has more
control of ITC determinations under section 1337 than at any time in its
history. It must therefore undertake a thorough review of all the com-
plex issues presented by each infringement appeal, not just those over
which the Commission itself was split. In the injury area in particular,
the court must analyze domestic industry and public interest considera-
tions as required by section 1337(a), (d), (e) and (f). The position of the
importer must be more carefully examined. The standard of review is
now explicitly limited to the substantial evidence test in accordance with
the 1980 Act,90 making the propriety of the Astra-Sj'uco court's use of that
standard a moot question. The CCPA, however, is now explicitly re-
quired to review the ITC's public interest findings in the same manner as
the patent validity, infringement, and injury findings. Appeals under the
1980 Act should therefore be subject to more extensive scrutiny than that
evident in Astra-Sj'ico.
American patent holders have become accustomed to unquestioned
protection of their monopolies because of traditional American techno-
logical and industrial superiority, assisted by past Commission inactivity.
The domestic consumer market, however, is no longer restricted to do-
mestic products. High quality, often superior goods are available from
foreign manufacturers frequently at lower prices. The Commission is in-
vestigating a steadily increasing number of petitions under section
1337.9 1 The CCPA, as the body entrusted with review and control of
ITC determinations, must be alert to overzealous attempts to transform
section 1337 into a trade barrier. Only the Commission's and in turn the
CCPA's careful and thorough evaluation of the effect of an imported
product on a valid domestic competitor, on the economy as a whole and
89 Between 1936 and 1968 the Commission heard only three cases and ordered no exclu-
sions. Between 1974 and 1975, however, 71 complaints were filed, resulting in II exclusion
orders. Fisher, supra note 54, at 16; Jacobs & Hove, Remedies for Unfair Import Competition in the
United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1, 19 n. 116 (1980).
90 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c) (West Supp. 1981).
91 The number of import investigations before the ITC was 93 in 1979 and 140 in 1980.
45 Fed. Reg. Annual Index (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. Annual Index (1979).
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on the consumer in particular, can afford the most equitable balance
between protection of patent rights and protection of the consumer
interest.
--- SHELLEY M. GOLDSTEIN
